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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of geographic diversification on bank value by em-
ploying a data set comprising the largest banks across the world, originating from both
developed and emerging countries. The findings suggest that the value impact of in-
ternational diversification depends on the financial development level of a bank’s home
country: higher levels of diversification are associated with changes in valuations only for
banks originating from emerging countries. In addition, the locus of internationalization
matters for the direction of effects: while markets respond positively to the intra-regional
expansion activities of emerging country banks, they seem to believe that these banks
cannot benefit from diversifying into far away markets.
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1 Introduction
Across-business lines and cross-border consolidations during the last two decades have led to
the prominence of complex international financial conglomerates. Concerns over enhanced
cross-border financial sector interdependencies and the potential systemic consequences of
disruptions to large financial organizations have become a central topic of research and policy,
particularly in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (Cetorelli & Goldberg, 2014). As
argued by Herring & Carmassi (2012), the complexity of corporate structures adopted by
international financial conglomerates is itself a significant source of systemic risk, as it can
hinder timely regulatory intervention and disposition in the event of bankruptcy. This, in
turn, can aggravate moral hazard problems implicit in the financial safety net, and diminish
both market discipline and the ability of supervisors to substitute regulatory discipline for
market discipline.
Since the mid-1990s and up until the onset of the recent financial crisis, the internation-
alization of financial institutions has increased dramatically (Claessens & van Horen, 2012).
The main contributing factors to this phenomenon were the liberalization and deregulation of
financial markets in developed countries, the higher demand for international financial services
arising from increased economic and financial integration, and the mitigation of geographic
distance effects on bank efficiency due to technological improvements (Berger et al., 2004).
Following these developments, a rich literature has emerged analyzing the determinants and
consequences of foreign bank entry and acquisitions.1 The experience from the recent global
crisis has also brought to light the previously under-appreciated destabilising impact of sys-
temically relevant global banks on host countries (de Haas, 2014).
This study seeks to undertake an up-to-date assessment of the evolution of bank-level ge-
ographic diversification and examine the relationship between geographic diversification and
financial performance, using data from the largest banks across the world. The global bank-
ing system has now become more heterogeneous than ever before due to the increasingly
important role of foreign banks from emerging markets and the rising trend towards greater
regional2 activity, as noted by Claessens & van Horen (2014) and BIS (2014). While the
ongoing restructuring in global banking has been examined at the industry-level, it has yet
to be considered at the bank-level when assessing the performance effects of geographic di-
versification. The present paper aims to fill this gap by focusing on the crisis and post-crisis
years and by exploring the performance implications of both intra-regional and inter-regional
diversification.3 In addition, it contributes to the literature by investigating the conditionality
of the resulting effects upon the financial development of a bank’s home country. As argued
by Claessens & van Horen (2014), banks originating from emerging markets and developing
countries (ECs) have become relatively more regional over time, compared to banks originat-
ing from advanced or developed countries (DCs), because they have a stronger competitive
advantage in countries which are physically closer. Consequently, a distinction between EC
banks and DC banks may reveal insightful information about cross-country heterogeneities in
diversification effects within and across regions.
1See, for instance, Berger et al. (2004), Buch & DeLong (2004), Magri et al. (2005) and Focarelli & Pozzolo
(2005) on determinants of foreign bank entry; Hasan & Marton (2003), Berger et al. (2005) and Claessens &
van Horen (2012) on the performance impacts of foreign bank entry and acquisitions; and Haselmann (2006),
de Haas & van Lelyveld (2006), Maechler et al. (2010) and de Haas & van Lelyveld (2014) on the stabilizing
and destabilizing roles of multinational banks.
2Regions are groupings of countries with physical continuity and proximity, and hence are economically
different, geographically distant and characterized by attempts towards higher regional cohesion (Rugman &
Verbeke, 2007; Arregle et al., 2009).
3Intra-regional diversification refers to diversification within a single region and may occur in any region
where the firm is already present, including its home region, whereas inter-regional diversification refers to
diversification across regions (Qian et al., 2013).
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Our empirical analysis involves two stages. First, we construct several measures of bank-
level multinationality and international diversification and document the evolution of these
measures over the last decade. This allows us to examine fluctuations in geographic diversi-
fication during and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and uncover differences in
diversification trends between EC banks and DC banks. Second, we investigate the impact
of intra-regional and inter-regional diversification on bank performance and test whether the
resulting effects vary significantly with respect to a bank’s home country. Rather than looking
at the diversification impacts on bank efficiency, risk or return, we focus on the net impact
on bank valuations, as in Laeven & Levine (2007) and Goetz et al. (2013). By doing that, we
can observe how banks’ diversification strategies within and across regions - which can boost
economies of scale, promote bank efficiency or generate agency problems - are actually assessed
by the markets. To capture the existence of rich dynamics in bank valuations and correct
for potential endogeneity problems stemming from simultaneous relationships between bank
value and diversification measures,4 we use a dynamic econometric framework and employ
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation techniques.
By way of preview, the main findings can be listed as follows. First, during the crisis years,
there are significant shifts in the level and intensity of bank-level geographic diversification,
especially for banks headquartered in ECs. Second, higher levels of geographic diversification
are associated with changes in valuations for EC banks, but not for DC banks. Third, the
direction of effects depends on the locus of internationalization: while higher levels of intra-
regional expansion lead to value enhancement, higher levels of inter-regional expansion seem
to induce a negative (but statistically unstable) impact on the valuation of EC banks. These
findings are invariant to a number of alternative specifications and tests, including controlling
for changes in geographic and institutional distance between headquarters and subsidiaries.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and
develops the main hypotheses to be tested; Section 3 presents alternative measures of inter-
national diversification, outlines the empirical strategy and describes the data and sampling
procedure used; Section 4 reports the empirical results and investigates their robustness; Sec-
tion 5 provides a discussion of the study’s conclusions.
2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
2.1 Bank value and international diversification
Geographic diversification can enhance the valuations of financial institutions through a va-
riety of channels. For instance, higher levels of geographic diversification may reduce the
exposure to idiosyncratic local shocks (Diamond, 1984; Deng & Elyasiani, 2008), enhance
managerial efficiency (or x-efficiency) and scale and scope economies (Berger & DeYoung,
2001), diversify sources of funding, and improve internal capital markets (Houston et al.,
1997; de Haas & van Lelyveld, 2010; Cetorelli & Goldberg, 2012). However, geographic di-
versification can also lead to a discount in the valuation of financial institutions. Efficiency
disadvantages may occur when inferior management practices are spread over a larger amount
of resources or when transfers of managerial skills to new geographic markets are not possible
(Berger & DeYoung, 2001). Difficulties associated with managing a larger and geographically
diverse organization may result in scale and scope diseconomies. As the physical distance
between bank headquarters and local offices increases, monitoring the local economic envi-
ronment becomes more challenging and costly. Agency problems can be intensified as well,
4Endogeneity may arise when highly valued banks are more likely to diversify regionally or globally; for
instance, due to lower cost of external finance.
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since geographic spread makes it more difficult for outsiders to monitor and exert effective
corporate control (Deng & Elyasiani, 2008; Goetz et al., 2013).5
Acknowledging that engaging in cross-border activities is an important strategy for diversi-
fication, a body of literature has offered insights to the international expansion - performance
debate. When financial institutions expand internationally, they enjoy additional risk di-
versification benefits since they are better positioned to diversify away country-specific risks
(Garc´ıa-Herrero & Va´zquez, 2013). However, they are also faced with the ‘liability of for-
eignness’ (LOF), which refers to “all additional costs a firm operating in a market overseas
incurs that a local firm would not incur” (Zaheer, 1995, p.343).6 In line with the market risk
hypothesis of Berger et al. (2014), the LOF, together with foreign exchange risk on foreign
assets and other market specific conditions (such as political and economic instability), may
render international banks more risky. International expansion has also been associated with
banks’ market power at home, and, as a result, with their valuations. For instance, Buch
et al. (2013) show that German banks with higher foreign asset share have higher market
power due to advantages in private information acquisition - obtained through international
lending relations. These advantages, however, disappear and market power weakens when
banks expand into too many foreign countries.
Testing whether the LOF exists in global banking, Miller & Parkhe (2002) find that
foreign-owned banks are less x-efficient than host country banks. They also find that a bank’s
home environment has a strong impact on its efficiency abroad, as suggested by the national
competitive advantage perspective. Likewise, Vu et al. (2015), comparing domestic and foreign
bank loan syndications in Australia, report that domestic banks have home market advantages,
which allow them to offer more favorable loan terms to borrowers. On a different vein, Berger
et al. (2000) provide evidence in favor of a limited form of global advantage hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, some foreign banks can overcome distance-related organizational
diseconomies and other cross-border disadvantages and achieve better efficiency compared to
domestic banks, due to favorable home-country market, regulatory and supervisory conditions.
It has also been suggested that the geographic, cultural and institutional proximity between
the source and the host countries must be taken into account (in addition to their economic
links) when assessing the effects of international expansion. Indeed, a number of studies (see,
for instance, Galindo et al., 2003; Buch & DeLong, 2004; Focarelli & Pozzolo, 2005) show
that this proximity is correlated with banks’ cross-border expansion activities - and thus their
performance - as it reflects informational problems and learning costs of dealing with different
institutional set-ups across countries.
More recently, scholars have focused on deciphering the impact of international diver-
sification on risk. For example, Gulamhussen et al. (2014) support a positive relationship
between risk and international diversification for a cross-country sample of commercial banks,
while Berger et al. (2014) support a positive relationship between risk and internationaliza-
tion (measured by a bank’s foreign assets to gross total assets) for US commercial banks.
The existence of agency costs is possibly, according to the authors, the driving force behind
their findings. Meanwhile, Buch et al. (2013) show that international banks headquartered in
Germany are not riskier than domestic banks, and that the degree of diversification, rather
than the scale of foreign assets, matters for risk. At the same time, Garc´ıa-Herrero & Va´zquez
(2013), using data for international banks from the G7 countries, report that: (i) risk-adjusted
returns increase when the allocation of assets overseas increases; (ii) regional concentration is
5Studies also show that other forms of diversification, such as diversification of asset portfolio and activities,
are associated with more risky behavior, scale and scope diseconomies, and intensified agency problems (see,
for example, Acharya et al., 2006; Laeven & Levine, 2007).
6LOF arises mainly due to environment unfamiliarity, cultural, political and economic differences, and costs
associated with spatial distance.
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detrimental to risk-adjusted returns.
As the above discussion suggests, despite the voluminous research, the findings on the
links between international diversification and bank performance are still inconclusive, with
empirical studies depicting both positive and negative relationships. Clearly, further analysis
and empirical work are needed to determine which arguments are more consistent with empir-
ical evidence. New research in this direction should also take into account the recent trends
towards greater regional concentration and the heterogeneity of diversification effects across
banks headquartered in countries with different levels of financial development. The present
study seeks to do this.
2.2 Regional versus global geographic diversification
Recent advances in the international business literature note that multinational enterprises
(MNEs) tend to be more regional than global, in terms of breadth and depth of their market
coverage, and that most of their international activity is conducted within their home regions
(Rugman & Verbeke, 2004; Oh, 2009; Banalieva & Santoro, 2009; Banalieva et al., 2012).
Consistent with the regionalization hypothesis, this implies that the liability of intra-regional
expansion is much lower than the liability of inter-regional expansion; that is, the LOF is
higher when entering into other world regions relative to expanding within the home region
(Rugman & Verbeke, 2007).
A consensus is yet to be reached regarding the appropriate level of geographic diversifica-
tion. Garc´ıa-Herrero & Va´zquez (2013) argue that risk diversification benefits from interna-
tional expansion are limited when multinational banks follow concentrated regional strategies,
due to similar economic fundamentals and exposures to common risk factors within the re-
gions. On the other hand, studies focusing on MNEs (see Qian et al., 2010; Banalieva et al.,
2012) report a linear positive effect of intra-regional diversification on performance. Accord-
ing to these studies, cost economies and efficiency benefits are more likely to occur through
intra-regional expansion, due to home region similarities in terms of geography, economics,
institutions and politics, and spatial proximities. At the same time, Qian et al. (2010) report
the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between performance and inter-regional
diversification - and hence between performance and combined total diversification. While
low to moderate levels of inter-regional diversification yield positive returns to MNEs, higher
levels of inter-regional diversification result in diminishing returns, due to suboptimal alloca-
tion of resources across markets and high operational costs.7 The latter implies that MNEs
can maximize their potential returns by investing intra-regionally and by pursuing a moderate
path of total geographic diversification. Consequently, the locus of destination of the diver-
sification activities (intra-regional versus inter-regional) must be carefully considered when
investigating the performance effects of geographic diversification. As argued by Rugman &
Verbeke (2004), failure to do so may be a plausible reason for the mixed results reported in
the international business literature.
An increasing regional focus (or home bias) in multinational banks’ assets and operations
has been recently documented in the banking literature (see, for instance, Garc´ıa-Herrero &
Va´zquez, 2013; Cetorelli & Goldberg, 2014; Claessens & van Horen, 2014). Following the
discussion above, it is rather precarious to draw conclusions about the impact of international
diversification on bank performance based on past findings, since prior studies ignored the
locus of geographic diversification. To address this issue, we construct a number of interna-
tional diversification measures (capturing the level and intensity of diversification both within
and across different regions) and test their impact on bank valuations, using recent data from
7Expanding into less proximate and more dissimilar markets can also increase search and deliberation costs
and deteriorate efficiency performance (Banalieva et al., 2012).
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the largest banks across the world.
2.3 Developed country banks versus emerging country banks
It has been argued that EC firms expand internationally not only to exploit their existing
competitive advantages, but also to access new markets, strategic assets and knowledge. By
doing that, they can compete more effectively with global rivals and avoid institutional voids
and market constraints at home (Mathews, 2006; Luo & Tung, 2007).
A number of studies have documented an upward trend in the international expansion
activities of EC banks, especially since the onset of the global financial crisis (see, among
others, Claessens & van Horen, 2014; BIS, 2014). EC banks are stated to have the same
motivations to exploit internationalization advantages as DC banks, but, at the same time,
they are found to be smaller, present in fewer countries and with more regional focus. This
suggests that, while EC banks can benefit from diversifying into far away markets in search of
strategic assets and capabilities, their ability to compete with DC banks in such markets and
globally may be limited. Alternatively, they may have a competitive advantage over DC banks
in other EC markets, due to their familiarity with similar institutional settings (Van Horen,
2007; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008). As a result, their location choices - and hence their
performance - may be more sensitive to the cultural, institutional and geographic proximity
to target countries (Van Horen, 2007; Petrou, 2007; BIS, 2014).
Based on these arguments, we expect the expansion activities of DC banks and EC banks
to be assessed differently by the markets,8 and the overall impact of geographic diversification
on valuations for each bank group (DC banks vs EC banks) to be conditioned by the locus of
geographic diversification. We test this hypothesis in the following sections.
3 Empirical Methodology
3.1 Alternative measures of international diversification
Previous research has operationalized several alternative measures of firm-level multinational-
ity and international diversification. In our analysis, we employ a number of these measures,
first, to document the evolution of bank-level international diversification over the last decade
(Section 4.1), and second, to investigate the impact of international diversification on bank
value (Section 4.2).
Two of the most commonly used measures of internationalization in the banking literature
are international share and international concentration (see Garc´ıa-Herrero & Va´zquez, 2013;
Berger et al., 2014; Gulamhussen et al., 2014). International share is computed as:
International shareit =
fnit
Nit
(1)
where fnit is the number of foreign subsidiaries and Nit is the total number of subsidiaries of
bank i in year t. On the other hand, international concentration is computed as a transformed
Herfindahl index (Hit):
International concentrationit = 1−Hit = 1−
J∑
j=1
(
nijt
Nit
)2
(2)
8Rao-Nicholson & Salaber (2015) find that only acquisitions of DC banks by EC banks in the post-global
financial crisis period created value for acquirers’ shareholders.
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where J is the total number of countries in which bank i has subsidiaries, and nijt is the
number of subsidiaries in host country j in year t.9 Both measures vary in the interval
[0, 1], with values close to 0 indicating low geographic diversification and values close to 1
indicating high geographic diversification. The advantage of the latter measure is that it
takes into account both the number of countries in which a bank is present and the share
of subsidiaries in each country, and thus it can better assess the geographic dispersion of
the bank’s operations. We calculate two versions of the Herfindahl-type measure: the first
captures global-level concentration as in Eq. (2) (‘International Concentration’) and the
second captures concentration within the region in which the parent bank is headquartered
(‘Regional Concentration’). To construct the regional index, we divide the countries into
six continent-based regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, North and Central America, Oceania and
South America.10
A wide range of firm-level internationalization measures has also been proposed in the
international business literature, considering the locus of destination of the diversification
activities. Aggarwal et al. (2011) develop a classification system for the degree of a firm’s
multinationality based on two dimensions: breadth (the extent of geographic spread of op-
erations) and depth (the degree of engagement with and exposure to each geographic unit).
Specifically, a firm whose business activities take place entirely within its home country is
defined as domestic (D), a firm that conducts business only in the region in which it is head-
quartered (home region) is defined as regional (R), a firm that conducts business in more than
one region (but not fully globally) is defined as trans-regional (T ), and a firm that conducts
business in all six regions is defined as global (G). R is further divided into three categories
- R1 (less than one-third of the countries in the region), R2 (between one-third and two-
thirds) and R3 (more than two-thirds) - and T is further divided into four categories - T2
(two regions), T3 (three regions), T4 (four regions), and T5 (five regions). Drawing upon the
Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s scheme and using subsidiary presence as the diversification dimen-
sion, we classify our sampled banks into the aforementioned categories. It must be stressed
that this system imposes no scale or number thresholds in determining a firm’s presence in a
country or region. Furthermore, it does not include any metric for distance, even though it
suggests that trans-regional or global activities will generally be more distant from the firm’s
home base compared to domestic or home regional activities.
Banalieva & Santoro (2009) offer a finer-grained classification of a firm’s geographic ori-
entation that distinguishes between its local (home-country), regional (rest of home region),
and global (rest of world) geographic segments, with the first two forming the intra-regional
dimension. Based on this classification, a firm is said to have local orientation if its local-
to-total sales ratio exceeds the regional-to-total sales ratio and the global-to-total sales ratio
(L
T
> R
T
and L
T
> G
T
). Likewise, a firm is said to have regional and global orientation if its
regional-to-total sales ratio and global-to-total sales ratio is the highest, respectively. Fol-
lowing this framework, we calculate the intra-regional orientation of bank i as the difference
between R
T
and L
T
based on subsidiary presence (‘Intra-Regional Ratio’), with positive (neg-
9For a large number of subsidiaries in our sample, the value of total assets is not available for all the years
under consideration, which creates problems in constructing time-varying asset-based measures of international
diversification. We thus prefer to use subsidiary presence to calculate these measures, especially since we
undertook a painstaking effort to identify and correct for ownership structure changes during the sampled
period (see Section 3.3).
10Continent-based regional classification is preferable to other systems, such as using the broad ‘triad’ markets
of NAFTA, the European Union and Asia as in Rugman & Verbeke (2004), for two reasons: first, it encompasses
all the countries in the world; and second, it does not change over time as the regions are defined along
geographic rather than political lines (Aggarwal et al., 2011). The first attribute is particularly important
for our analysis since we consider large banks from all countries, including banks headquartered or having
subsidiaries in non-triad countries.
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ative) values indicating regional (local) geographic orientation. Similarly, we calculate the
global orientation of bank i as the ratio G
T
based on subsidiary presence (‘Global Ratio’), with
higher values indicating a bank focusing more on its global segment than its home-regional
segment.
Finally, Qian et al. (2010) define total geographic diversification as the sum of two com-
ponents: intra-regional (diversification across countries within a region) and inter-regional
(diversification across different regions) - both measured based on entropy calculations. Fol-
lowing this approach, we construct inter-regional diversification (‘INTER’) as:
INTERit =
M∑
m=1
simt ln
(
1
simt
)
simt =
nimt
Nit
(3)
where M is the number of regions in which bank i has subsidiaries and simt is the proportion
of the mth region to the bank’s total number of subsidiaries in all regions. Similarly, we
construct intra-regional diversification (‘INTRA’) as:
INTRAit =
M∑
m=1
simt ×

 J∑
j=1
wijmt ln
(
1
wijmt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
INTRAimt
wijmt =
nijmt
Nimt
(4)
where wijmt is the proportion of the number of subsidiaries in the j
th country to the total num-
ber of subsidiaries in the mth region. In other words, INTRAit is the weighted average of the
corresponding regional-level entropy values INTRAimt, the weight being previously defined
as simt. We also calculate a modified intra-regional diversification measure, ‘INTRA-Home’,
which accounts for subsidiary presence in the home regions only (simt = 0 if the m
th region is
not the home region). This allows us to test whether the relationship between ‘INTRA’ and
bank value is driven by diversification within the home region, where the parent banks have
the least LOF. The Qian et al. (2010)’s measures reflect not only the multiplicity of the for-
eign markets, but also the size of the foreign operations (see also Oh, 2009). Hence, compared
to the other approaches, they can more adequately capture the level and intensity of banks’
international diversification within and across different regions and account for changes in
the corresponding trends during the recent financial crisis. Based on these arguments, ‘IN-
TRA’, ‘INTER’ and ‘TOTAL’ (the sum of ‘INTRA’ and ‘INTER’) are our preferred measures
for exploring the bank value effects of international diversification, although the alternative
measures discussed in this section are also used for robustness tests.
3.2 Bank value model specification
To evaluate the impact of international diversification on bank value, we employ an empirical
specification that builds on the work of Laeven & Levine (2007), Caprio et al. (2007), Deng
& Elyasiani (2008), and takes the following form:
Qint =αQint−1 + β‘ID’int + γXint + δYnt + µi + λt + uint (M.1)
where Q is the Tobin’s Q ratio, calculated as the ratio of the market value of equity plus the
book value of liabilities to the book value of assets; ‘ID’ ∈ {‘TOTAL’, ‘INTRA’, ‘INTER’} is
an entropy measure of international diversification, as defined in Section 3.1; X is a vector
of bank-level control variables; Y is a vector of country-level control variables; i, n, t index
bank, country, and time, respectively; µi and λt represent bank-specific and year-specific
effects, respectively; and u is an i.i.d error term.
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Vector X contains a broad range of bank-specific traits related to bank value commonly
used in previous studies. Specifically, it includes: (i) non-interest income to assets (‘Income
Diversity’) to account for differences in the diversity of financial activities that may affect
bank risk, margins and value (DeYoung & Rice, 2004; Stiroh & Rumble, 2006; Goetz et al.,
2013); (ii) total equity to total assets (‘Capitalization’) to account for the interactions between
capitalization levels and bank value, and as an indirect proxy for bank risk (Buch et al., 2014);
(iii) cost to income (‘Operational Inefficiency’) calculated as total operating expenses to total
operating income (Caprio et al., 2007); (iv) non-performing loans to gross loans (‘NPL’) as
a proxy for loan quality and portfolio risk (Berger et al., 2009); and, (v) bank size measured
by three binary variables that group banks into total asset quartiles, calculated separately for
each region to account for size-level differences across regions.11
On the other hand, vector Y includes the GDP growth rate (‘Growth’) and the inflation
rate (‘Inflation’) as proxies of macroeconomic fluctuations and institutional effects in the
home country of the parent bank (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010), which are expected to
influence not only a bank’s market value, but also its capacity to diversify geographically.
Vector Y also includes the binary variable ‘EC’ coding the banks headquartered in ECs
to account for the positive relationship between the level of economic development and the
demand for cross-border financial services (Buch & DeLong, 2004). Finally, the previous
period’s Tobin’s Q is included among the explanatory variables to capture persistence over
time.
As discussed in Section 2.3, the market’s valuation of EC banks’ internationalization strate-
gies may be different than that of DC banks, and this relationship may depend on the locus
of international diversification. To test this argument, we re-estimate model (M.1) with ‘ID’
replaced by the interaction terms ‘ID ∗ EC’ and ‘ID ∗ DC’, where ‘DC’ (1−‘EC’) is a binary
variable coding banks headquartered in DCs. In this way, it is possible to estimate the im-
pact of intra-regional, inter-regional and total diversification on bank value conditional on the
origin of the parent bank (headquartered in DCs versus ECs).12
We estimate model (M.1) using the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell & Bond
(1998). This estimator is designed for short, wide panels (small T , large N), and to fit
linear models with one dynamic dependent variable, additional controls and fixed effects, and
hence, it is appropriate for our data and model. In addition, it corrects for the endogeneity
of potentially endogenous explanatory variables, like the international diversification measure
and the bank-level control variables included in vector X. To improve the precision of the two-
step estimators for hypothesis testing, we apply the “Windmeijer finite-sample correction” to
the reported standard errors. Furthermore, to reduce the risk of instrument proliferation and
make sure that the number of instruments does not exceed the number of groups, we collapse
the instrument set using the procedure described in Roodman (2009).13 The consistency of
the GMM estimator depends on the condition of no second-order serial correlation and the
validity of instruments. To make sure that these conditions are met, we perform two tests:
the Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, and the
11As suggested by Cole & Gunther (1995) and Laeven & Levine (2007), large banks can diversify risks better
and enjoy economies of scale and scope. In addition, if large banks are perceived to be ‘too-big-to-fail’, then
size would be associated with lower cost of funding and higher value (Berger et al., 1999).
12Alternatively, one could consider separate regressions for DC banks and EC banks. However, this would
reduce significantly the number of banks for each regression and would make the GMM estimation results less
reliable. Specifically, it would generate a great many instruments, compared to the number of cross-sections,
and weaken the Hansen test of the instruments’ joint validity.
13The instruments used are lagged levels of the dependent variable and the endogenous covariates (bank-level
controls) for the first differencing equation, and lagged differences of these variables for the level equation. The
exogenous covariates (country-level control, year and size dummy variables) are instrumented by themselves in
the level equation and by first-differences in the first differencing equation.
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Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions.
3.3 Data sources and sampling procedure
Data are mainly retrieved from two commercial databases provided by Bureau van Dijk:
BankScope and Zephyr. To assemble our dataset, we first extract yearly account data14 over
the period 2004-2013 on all publicly listed banks in BankScope with total assets exceeding
US$50 million.15 We include commercial, savings, mortgage and cooperative banks, and
holding companies and exclude investment and state banks, and non-bank credit institutions,
which have no compelling reasons to internationalize their activities (Focarelli & Pozzolo,
2005). We also exclude banks headquartered in off-shore centers, such as Andorra, Bermuda,
Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Panama and Saint Lucia, because they typically have less standard
business models (Gulamhussen et al., 2014). We then match our initial sample of parent
banks with the yearly data of their significant subsidiaries; that is, subsidiaries that are at
least 50% owned by the parent and account for at least 0.1% of parent-bank assets in the last
available year. For each subsidiary (level 1) we check whether it owns sub-subsidiaries (level
2) that are larger than 0.1% of the ultimate bank owner (level 0).16 If it does, we include the
sub-subsidiaries as a separate entities of the parent bank. Since ownership data in BankScope
reflects the latest status, we use acquisition data from Zephyr to identify the ownership changes
that occurred during the sampled period. More precisely, for each subsidiary we trace back
in which year t it was acquired and include it in the structure of the parent bank from t+ 1
onwards. Similarly, for each parent bank we trace back which subsidiaries it sold in year t
and add these subsidiaries to the structure of the parent bank from t− 1 backwards.
This procedure results in a final sample of 156 parent banks headquartered in 56 countries
(19 DC and 37 EC). Japan and China have the highest number of bank-year observations in
our sample, with 10% and 6% of the total number of observations, respectively. It must be
noted that we exclude parent banks from the US to make sure that our results are not driven
by the US banking system, which has a large number of banks with the aforementioned
characteristics. In addition, the US banking system is quite special in the sense that it
is dominated by relatively smaller and non-diversified (domestic) banks (see also Laeven &
Levine, 2007), and thus including these banks in a panel regression with larger and more
internationally diversified banks from other countries will lead to selection bias problems and
misleading inferences. We do, however, test whether our results hold when we add the ten
largest US banks (see Section 4.3).
Data on macro-economic variables are collected from theWorld Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI). Data on bilateral geographic and institutional distances are obtained from
the CEPII’s GeoDist Database (Mayer & Zignago, 2011) and the Heritage Foundation’s Index
of Economic Freedom, respectively. Descriptive statistics for all regression variables are given
in Table A.1, whereas the cross-correlation matrix for these variables is displayed in Table A.2.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Evolution of international diversification: DC versus EC banks
We begin our analysis by considering the evolution of international diversification between
2004 and 2013, using the measures described in Section 3.1, for both DC banks and EC
14All extracted financial variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
15Small banks may face additional challenges and costs, and thus are significantly less likely to diversify
across borders.
16To calculate these shares, we use consolidated financial statements for parent banks and unconsolidated
financial statements for subsidiaries.
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banks.
Figure 1 displays the two Herfindahl-type indices of geographic concentration. Looking at
‘International Concentration’ (Panel (a)), a number of conclusions come to front. First, DC
banks are more internationally diversified than EC banks, which is not surprising given that
EC banks are relatively smaller and late-comers to the internationalization stage. Second, the
degree of international diversification starts decreasing with the onset of the global financial
crisis for both groups of banks. Third, EC banks experience a sharper drop in geographic
diversification during the years 2008 to 2011 compared to DC banks, but manage to recover
some of this reduction in the two years that follow (2012 and 2013). Focusing now on ‘Regional
Concentration’ (Panel (b)), we can observe similar trends, even though the fluctuations during
the crisis years seem to be less pronounced. Moreover, the gap in geographic diversification
between the two bank groups is clearly smaller (compared to Panel (a)), suggesting that EC
banks are more dispersed within their home region than internationally.
Table 1 shows the classification of our sample according to the Aggarwal et al. (2011)’s
system of firm multinationality. Out of the 1200 bank-year observations, 300 (25%) are classi-
fied as domestic (D) and 354 (29.5%) as regional (R). Within the regional category, nearly all
the observations indicate operations in less than one-third of the home-region countries (R1).
The trans-regional category (T ) is the largest one in our sample, with 546 (45.5%) bank-year
observations. The most common types in the latter category are T2 and T3, indicating opera-
tions in two and three regions, respectively. No observations are categorized as type R3 or G,
suggesting that no banks in our sample operate in more than two-thirds of the home-region
countries or have full global reach. Splitting the sampled banks by origin confirms that DC
banks are spread more widely across different regions compared to EC banks.
< Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 here >
Measures of geographic orientation - based on the Banalieva & Santoro (2009)’s framework
- are presented in Figure 2. As a first observation, this figure illustrates that EC and DC banks
focus equally on their regional and local (home country) markets, as evidenced by the ‘Intra-
Regional Ratio’ with values fluctuating around zero (Panel (c)). In the case of EC banks,
though, there is a notable jump in intra-regional orientation right before and during the
global financial crisis, driven by changes in the regional and local orientations of the opposite
direction (Panels (a) and (b)). This might be the result of EC banks acquiring subsidiaries
of deleveraging DC banks in their home regions during this period. Figure 2 also shows
that global orientation is the least popular geographic orientation for the two bank categories
(Panel (d)), which reinforces the argument that a global expansion poses notable difficulties for
banks in both DCs and ECs (see Rugman & Verbeke, 2004, 2007). Interestingly, the average
EC bank seems to be more globally oriented than the average DC bank, even though there is
evidence of convergence in their ‘Global Ratio’ over the sampled period. It must be stressed
that these measures do not capture the intensity of banks’ international diversification and are
not sensitive to the size of investment. For instance, an Asian bank with one local subsidiary
and one subsidiary in Europe will have the same ‘Global Ratio’ as a European bank with five
subsidiaries in the same region and five subsidiaries spread across the other five regions.
Panels (a), (b) and (c) of Figure 3 present the three geographic diversification measures
of ‘TOTAL’, ‘INTRA’ and ‘INTER’, whereas Panel (d) displays the modified intra-regional
diversification measure ‘INTRA-Home’. A number of observations emerge. First, the average
level of geographic diversification of DC banks is higher than that of EC banks both within
regions and across regions, which, in turn, generates a higher average level of total geographic
diversification for the former group of banks. Second, all three measures show an overall
declining trend during the global financial crisis period - the most prominent downturn being
observed in inter-regional diversification, starting in 2008 and ending in 2011. Third, in
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the last couple of years, the two groups of banks seem to pursue different strategies: while
EC banks become intra-regionally and inter-regionally more diversified, DC banks engage in
slightly lower levels of diversification. Finally, comparing the two intra-regional diversification
measures, ‘INTRA’ and ‘INTRA-Home’, we can see that geographic diversification within the
home-region accounts for almost all of the intra-regional diversification.
< Insert Figure 2 and Figure 3 here >
4.2 Bank value and international diversification
We continue our analysis by estimating model (M.1) for the period 2007-2013.17 Columns
(1) to (6) of Table 2 show the results of short specifications, as they do not include the
bank-level control variables (vector X) and the two macroeconomic variables, ‘Growth’ and
‘Inflation’. As a first point, we can notice that the coefficient on the previous year’s Tobin’s
Q is positive and statistically significant, indicating the persistence in market value over time
and justifying the use of a dynamic model. Furthermore, our estimates suggest that a higher
degree of total diversification is not associated with changes in bank value (column (1)), and
this result persists when we partition the sample into DC banks and EC banks (column (2)).
Turning now to the components of total diversification, we find evidence that our sampled
banks, and more precisely the banks headquartered in ECs, can benefit from intra-regional
diversification: while the coefficient on ‘INTRA’ in column (3) and ‘INTRA∗EC’ in column (4)
are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels of significance, the coefficient on
‘INTRA∗DC’ in column (4) fails to reach statistical significance. Inter-regional diversification,
on the other hand, does not appear to exert a significant influence on bank value, and this
finding holds for both bank groups (see columns (5) and (6)).
Including all the control variables confirms the main result reported in the previous para-
graph: the value of EC banks responds positively to increasing levels of intra-regional diversi-
fication, which, in turn, produces an overall positive impact of ‘INTRA’ on Tobin’s Q. In fact,
the estimates in the full model specifications are economically and statistically more significant
than those reported in the short specifications (see columns (9) and (10)), which can explain
the statistically significant positive impact of total diversification on bank value (column (7)).
Moreover, we now find that greater inter-regional diversification is value-destroying for EC
banks (column (12)), suggesting that a broader (less concentrated) multi-regional spread dur-
ing crisis years is perceived as a costly and highly risky strategy for these banks. Concerning
the bank-level control variables, only the coefficient on ‘NPL’ is statistically significant at
conventional levels of significance - with the negative sign indicating that poor asset quality
is associated with lower values of Tobin’s Q. Finally, among the macroeconomic variable, in-
flation seems to have a positive impact on bank value, although the corroborating evidence is
statistically weak.
Do the reported relationships become weaker when we control for unobserved regional-
level effects; for example, location-specific advantages or disadvantages of a regional market?
To answer this question, we augment model (M.1) with regional dummy variables and run
the same regression set-up. The estimates, presented in columns (1)-(6) of Table 3, are of a
similar magnitude and statistical significance to those presented in columns (7)-(12) of Table 2,
and lead to the same general conclusion: while higher values of intra-regional diversification
boost EC banks’ valuations, higher values of inter-regional diversification have the opposite
effect. Tests of joint statistical significance reveal that the inclusion of the regional dummy
17We focus on the period 2007-2013 for two main reasons. First, our dataset is significantly less balanced
in the pre-2007 period, and thus considering earlier years may produce misleading inferences. Second, by
excluding the pre-crisis years, we avoid having to control for crisis-induced structural breaks in our model
variables or endogeneity problems which may arise from the inclusion of crisis indicators.
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variables does not add explanatory power to the model, and thus we omit these variables
from subsequent regressions. Expanding our sample by adding the ten largest US banks, as
discussed in Section 3.3, does not change our baseline estimates either - see columns (7)-
(12) of Table 3. Once again, the interaction term ‘INTRA ∗ EC’ (‘INTER ∗ EC’) enters the
regression with a positive (negative) sign and is statistically significant, yielding a positive
and statistically significant impact of ‘INTRA’ on Tobin’s Q.
Table 4 has the same structure as Table 2, but it shows the results for the shorter time
period 2009-2013. This allows us to investigate the sensitivity of the reported effects when we
exclude the two years of the global financial crisis, 2007 and 2008, which are associated with
heightened risk in international financial markets. Despite the smaller number of observations
and the increase in the time persistence of bank value (captured by a larger estimate of the
lagged Tobin’s Q), the results obtained confirm the picture emerging from Table 2 - even
though the economic significance of the interaction terms ‘INTRA ∗EC’ and ‘INTER ∗EC’ is
now smaller.
Overall, our findings suggest that the value impact of international diversification is condi-
tioned by the home country of the parent bank: higher levels of diversification are associated
with changes in valuations only for banks originating from ECs. At the same time, our find-
ings indicate that the locus of internationalization matters for the direction of effects. While
markets respond positively to intra-regional expansion activities, they seem to believe that
EC banks cannot benefit from diversifying into far away markets, or that they cannot compete
with DC banks at the global level, especially in periods of high risk.
< Insert Tables 2, 3 and 4 here >
4.3 Robustness tests
We perform various tests to assess the robustness of the above findings. Table 5 displays the
results of alternative empirical specifications, where, for brevity and comparability, we focus
on the interaction terms ‘ID ∗ EC’ and ‘ID ∗ DC’. First, we check whether our results hold
when we use a simpler bank value measure as dependent variable; that is, the ratio of the
market value of equity to the book value of equity, ‘Market-to-book’, as in Caprio et al. (2007)
(columns (1)-(3)). Second, we test whether our results become less pronounced when we re-
place ‘INTRA’ with ‘INTRA-Home’ (columns (4)-(6)). Third, we experiment by re-defining
‘TOTAL’, ‘INTRA’ and ‘INTER’ to capture geographic diversification across five regions,
instead of six (columns (7)-(9)).18 Fourth, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the
exclusion of Chinese banks, which constitute the largest country-group of EC banks in our
sample (columns (10)-(12)). Overall, the estimates obtained are in line with the main finding
of the previous section: intra-regional diversification, and particularly diversification across
the home-region countries, is value-creating for EC banks. The results also largely confirm
the finding that greater inter-regional diversification is value-destroying for EC banks, as indi-
cated by the negative sign and the economic significance of the interaction term ‘INTER∗EC’.
However, the corresponding effects appear to be statistically less robust across different spec-
ifications. In order to address concerns about the existence of unobserved, time-invariant
country heterogeneity, we also re-conduct the analysis by adding country dummies for coun-
tries with more than three banks (and thus sufficient number of country-year observations),
which does not change our main results. Using weighted regressions, where the observations
are weighted by the logarithmic inverse of the proportion of sampled banks from each country,
does not alter the paper’s findings either (results available upon request).
18To do that, we merge ‘Asia’ and ‘Oceania’ into one region.
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Although our diversification measures implicitly take into account that inter-regional in-
vestment involves markets far away from banks’ home regions, they do not explicitly utilize a
metric for bilateral distance. As argued by Ghemawat (2001), distance has cultural, adminis-
trative, geographic and economic dimensions, and results in costs and risks in doing business
internationally. To investigate whether our results are actually driven by distance differences
between the parent bank and its subsidiaries, we augment the model specification with two
distance indicators, ‘Geographic Distance’ and ‘Institutional Distance’.19 Each indicator is
calculated as a weighted average of the logarithmic distance between the home country of
the parent bank and the countries of residence of its subsidiaries, where the weight is the
parent bank’s share of subsidiaries in each country. For ‘Geographic Distance’ we use bilat-
eral distances in kilometers, while for ‘Institutional Distance’ we use bilateral differences in
institutional development.20 As shown in columns (1)-(3) of Table 6, ‘Geographic Distance’
fails to reach statistical significance and the key findings discussed in the previous section re-
main essentially the same. On the other hand, ‘Institutional Distance’ enters with a positive
sign and is statistically significant in the regressions with ‘INTER’ and ‘TOTAL’,21 but once
again, it does not change the inferences on the diversification measures.
We also consider the sensitivity of our results to employing alternative measures of inter-
national diversification, as discussed in Sections 3.1 and 4.1. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) of
Table 7 report the estimates when ‘International Concentration’, ‘Regional Concentration’,
‘Global Ratio’ and ‘Intra-Regional Ratio’, respectively, is used as the diversification proxy,
whereas columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) report the corresponding interaction terms with ‘EC’
and ‘DC’. Despite the fact that these measures assess the geographic spread of operations
in a different way, the results obtained provide evidence that supports our previous findings
(that is, when using the entropy measures ‘TOTAL’, ‘INTRA’ and ‘INTER’ to capture di-
versification). Specifically, while the coefficient on ‘ID ∗ EC’ is statistically significant in the
regressions with ‘Regional Concentration’ and ‘Intra-Regional Ratio’, it fails to reach sta-
tistical significance in the regressions with ‘International Concentration’ and ‘Global Ratio’,
suggesting that, for EC banks, only a regional-based diversification strategy is value-creating.
Finally, we conduct further tests of robustness, such as excluding banks from particular
countries and employing different instrument structures. Once again, estimates based on these
tests are very similar to our baseline estimates (results available upon request).
< Insert Tables 5, 6 and 7 here >
5 Conclusions
The global banking system has now become more heterogeneous than ever before due to
the increasingly important role of foreign banks from emerging markets and the rising trend
towards greater regional activity. The existing literature on the internationalization - bank
performance debate ignores the locus of geographic diversification and fails to appreciate the
conditionality of effects upon the financial development level of a bank’s home country. Our
study fills this gap by exploring the performance implications of both intra-regional and inter-
regional diversification, and by examining whether the resulting effects vary between banks
headquartered in ECs and those headquartered in DCs. To this end, we consider data from
19The two variables are treated as endogenous, and thus instrumented by past values.
20Institutional development is based on four different aspects of economic freedom (rule of law, government
size, regulatory efficiency and market openness) and has been used in several related studies (see, for example,
Francis et al., 2008; Gubbi et al., 2010).
21Since ‘Institutional Distance’ is highly correlated with ‘INTER’ and ‘TOTAL’ (see Table A.2), one has to
be very cautious in drawing conclusions about the impact of institutional distance on bank value.
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the largest banks across the world during the crisis and post-crisis years, and employ GMM
estimation techniques.
The overall picture that emerges from the comparison of a wide range of diversification
measures is that level and intensity of banks’ international diversification vary significantly
over time, as well as between EC banks and DC banks. In particular, while the degree
of international diversification starts decreasing with the onset of the global financial crisis
for both groups of banks, EC banks experience a sharper drop in diversification during the
years 2008 to 2011. Furthermore, EC banks manage to recover some of this reduction in
the two years that follow, mostly due to increased intra-regional expansion. Concerning the
valuation impacts, two key results emerge. First, higher levels of geographic diversification
are associated with changes in valuations for EC banks, but not for DC banks. Given that
a regional focus is becoming increasingly important in global banking, the absence of value
gains for DC banks can be attributed to dismal growth prospects in the banking markets of
these countries, especially since the onset of the global financial crisis. Second, while markets
respond positively to the intra-regional expansion activities of EC banks, they seem to believe
that these banks cannot benefit from diversifying into far away markets or that they cannot
compete with DC banks in such markets.
The expansion of international financial institutions has been particularly strong since the
mid-1990s, reflecting the sharp increase in financial globalization. Given the concerns about
global banks serving as a risk transmission channel, the extent of international diversification
gains in banking is critically important for investors, bankers and policy-makers. The design
of regulatory policies and geographic expansion strategies should take into account that aggre-
gate or total international diversification is not a sufficient indicator of bank multinationality,
and that the value gains from international expansion depend on the banks’ home country
set-ups and the locus of international diversification, as indicated by the findings of this paper.
A Appendix
See Table A.1 and Table A.2.
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics and data sources
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Source
Tobin’s Q (Q) 935 1.030 0.081 0.844 1.455 BankScope
Income Diversity 910 0.397 0.175 -0.088 0.975 BankScope
Capitalization 935 0.085 0.053 0.012 0.378 BankScope
Operational Inefficiency 910 0.574 0.142 0.209 1.149 BankScope
NPL 903 0.016 0.017 0.000 0.114 BankScope
Growth 935 0.034 0.038 -0.148 0.183 WDI
Inflation 935 0.041 0.088 -0.276 1.038 WDI
TOTAL 935 0.502 0.458 0.000 1.430 BankScope & OC
INTRA 935 0.352 0.402 0.000 1.430 BankScope & OC
INTER 935 0.206 0.289 0.000 0.889 BankScope & OC
International Concentration 935 0.313 0.267 0.000 0.672 BankScope & OC
Regional Concentration 935 0.304 0.289 0.000 0.693 BankScope & OC
Global Ratio 935 0.289 0.372 0.000 1.000 BankScope & OC
Intra-Regional Ratio 935 0.040 0.690 -1.000 1.000 BankScope & OC
Geographic Distance 927 1.648 1.068 0.000 3.414 CEPII
Institutional Distance 935 7.202 1.249 4.336 9.375 IEF
WDI: World Bank’s World Development Indicators; OC: Own Calculations; CEPII: CEPII’s GeoDist
Database (Mayer & Zignago, 2011); IEF: The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.
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Table A.2: Cross correlation matrix for regression variables
Tobin’s Q Income Capitalization Operational NPL Growth Inflation TOTAL INTRA INTER Geographic Institutional
Diversity Inefficiency Distance Distance
Tobin’s Q 1.00
Income Diversity 0.08 1.00
Capitalization 0.30 0.05 1.00
Operational Inefficiency -0.28 0.23 -0.30 1.00
NPL -0.09 -0.13 0.23 -0.04 1.00
Growth 0.23 -0.01 0.33 -0.21 -0.06 1.00
Inflation 0.14 0.02 0.34 -0.09 0.13 0.21 1.00
TOTAL -0.06 0.15 -0.32 0.05 -0.13 -0.15 -0.05 1.00
INTRA -0.04 0.14 -0.29 0.05 -0.07 -0.20 -0.08 0.87 1.00
INTER -0.08 0.12 -0.22 0.04 -0.18 -0.02 -0.01 0.61 0.17 1.00
Geographic Distance 0.08 -0.03 -0.01 -0.20 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.46 0.33 0.38 1.00
Institutional Distance 0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.14 -0.05 0.22 0.06 0.38 0.13 0.57 0.73 1.00
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Table 1: Classifying bank-year observations using Aggarwal et al. (2011)’ system
All countries Developed Countries Emerging Countries
Symbol Count Perc Cum Perc Count Perc Cum Perc Count Perc Cum Perc
D 300 25.0 25.0 156 25.4 25.4 144 24.6 24.6
R1 344 28.67 53.67 174 28.3 53.7 170 29.1 53.7
R2 10 0.8 54.5 0 0.0 53.7 10 1.7 55.4
T2 370 30.8 85.3 144 23.4 77.1 226 38.6 94.0
T3 126 10.5 95.8 91 14.8 91.9 35 6.0 100.0
T4 30 2.5 98.3 30 4.9 96.8 0 0.0 100.0
T5 20 1.7 100.0 20 3.3 100.0 0 0.0 100.0
Total 1200 100.0 100.0 615 100.0 100.0 585 100.0 581.9
D: Banks with subsidiary presence only within their home country in year t; R1: Banks with subsidiary presence only
in the region in which they are headquartered in year t, and in less than one-third of the countries in that region;
R2: Banks with subsidiary presence only in the region in which they are headquartered in year t, and in one-third to
two-thirds of the countries in that region; T2, T3, T4, and T5: Banks with subsidiary presence in two regions, three
regions, four regions, and five regions in year t, respectively.
(a) ‘International Concentration’ (b) ‘Regional Concentration’
Figure 1: ‘International Share’ and ‘International Concentration’ for developed countries (solid
lines) and emerging countries (marked lines) over the period 2004-2013
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(a) ‘Regional Ratio’ (b) ‘Local Ratio’
(c) ‘Intra-Regional Ratio’ (d) ‘Global Ratio’
Figure 2: ‘Intra-Regional Ratio’, ‘Global Ratio’, ‘Regional Ratio’ and ‘Local Ratio’ for devel-
oped countries (solid lines) and emerging countries (marked lines) over the period 2004-2013
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(a) ‘TOTAL’ (b) ‘INTRA’
(c) ‘INTER’ (d) ‘INTRA-Home’
Figure 3: ‘TOTAL’, ‘INTRA’, ‘INTER’ and ‘INTRA-Home’ for developed countries (solid
lines) and emerging countries (marked lines) over the period 2004-2013
B
a
n
k
V
a
lu
e
a
n
d
G
eo
g
ra
p
h
ic
D
iv
ersifi
ca
tio
n
:
R
eg
io
n
a
l
v
s
G
lo
b
a
l
20
Table 2: International diversification and bank value: Basic results (2007-2013)
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q. Method: System Generalized Method of Moments.
Without control variables With control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged Tobin’s Q 0.37** 0.33** 0.34** 0.38** 0.47*** 0.40*** 0.24** 0.25** 0.23 0.28** 0.28** 0.28*
(2.46) (2.08) (2.36) (2.62) (3.18) (2.70) (2.01) (2.21) (1.64) (2.26) (2.08) (1.78)
TOTAL 0.04 0.07*
(1.01) (1.73)
INTRA 0.08** 0.10**
(2.29) (2.40)
INTER -0.25 -0.08
(1.41) (1.26)
ID ∗ ECa 0.07 0.17* -0.14 0.11 0.20*** -0.10*
(0.85) (1.90) (1.32) (1.48) (3.26) (1.72)
ID ∗ DCa -0.01 -0.01 -0.30 0.03 0.01 -0.08
(0.58) (0.15) (1.07) (0.41) (0.17) (0.84)
EC 0.03* -0.01 0.03*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.02
(1.87) (0.34) (2.62) (0.92) (0.23) (0.48) (1.29) (0.19) (1.36) (1.29) (0.70) (0.99)
Income Diversity 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.27) (0.12) (0.33) (0.19) (0.30) (0.07)
Capitalization 0.11 0.15 -0.05 0.06 0.03 0.02
(0.22) (0.30) (0.10) (0.12) (0.07) (0.05)
Operational Inefficiency 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.03
(0.55) (0.48) (0.62) (0.55) (0.23) (0.63)
NPL -0.94 -0.99* -1.11* -1.14** -0.73** -0.78**
(1.57) (1.75) (1.94) (2.02) (2.04) (2.09)
Growth 0.10 0.18 0.22 0.33* 0.03 0.02
(0.71) (0.92) (1.50) (1.84) (0.22) (0.12)
Inflation 0.05 0.07 0.10* 0.10 0.11* 0.10*
(0.87) (1.25) (1.70) (1.34) (1.76) (1.79)
Number of observations 708 708 708 708 708 708 698 698 698 698 698 698
Number of banks 141 141 141 141 141 141 139 139 139 139 139 139
Number of instruments 34 48 34 48 34 48 94 108 94 108 94 108
AR(2) p-valueb 0.67 0.70 0.65 0.58 0.63 0.67 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.82 0.90 0.90
Hansen p-valuec 0.12 0.19 0.28 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.38 0.60 0.60 0.73 0.13 0.18
Columns report estimated coefficients (|z|-statistics). All specifications include year dummy variables and size dummy variables. Equations estimated using
Windmeijer WC-robust standard errors. a ID ∈ {‘TOTAL’, ‘INTRA’, ‘INTER’}. b Reports the Arellano-Bond test p-value for serial correlation of order two
in the first-differenced residuals, where H0: no autocorrelation. c Reports the Hansen test p-value for over-identifying restrictions, where H0: over-identifying
restrictions are valid. ***,**,* Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level respectively.
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Table 3: International diversification and bank value: Including region-specific effects / Adding US banks
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q. Method: System Generalized Method of Moments.
Including region specific effects Including US banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged Tobin’s Q 0.30*** 0.28** 0.25** 0.27** 0.31** 0.31* 0.20* 0.22** 0.18 0.27** 0.27** 0.28*
(2.58) (2.31) (1.85) (2.13) (2.15) (1.95) (1.71) (2.14) (1.37) (2.29) (2.10) (1.95)
TOTAL 0.06 0.09**
(1.08) (2.03)
INTRA 0.13* 0.10**
(1.75) (2.31)
INTER -0.08 -0.07
(1.43) (1.51)
ID ∗ ECa 0.11 0.25** -0.10** 0.13 0.23*** -0.12**
(1.41) (2.54) (2.00) (1.57) (3.25) (2.42)
ID ∗ DCa 0.05 0.06 -0.08 0.05 0.01 -0.02
(0.84) (0.98) (0.88) (0.83) (0.14) (0.24)
Number of observations 698 698 698 698 698 698 756 756 756 756 756 756
Number of banks 139 139 139 139 139 139 148 148 148 148 148 148
Number of instruments 99 113 99 113 99 113 94 108 94 108 94 108
AR(2) p-valueb 0.98 0.95 0.88 0.76 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.85 0.87 0.72 0.78 0.77
Hansen p-valuec 0.36 0.60 0.46 0.55 0.13 0.19 0.56 0.72 0.51 0.50 0.20 0.31
Joint significance testd 0.15 0.12 0.49 0.19 0.13 0.07
See notes for Table 1. For brevity, the estimated coefficients on ‘Emerging’, ‘Income diversity’, ‘Capitalization’, ‘Operational Inefficiency’, ‘NPL’, ‘Growth’ and
‘Inflation’ are not displayed. d Reports the χ2-test p-value, where H0: the coefficients on region dummy variables are jointly equal to zero.
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Table 4: International diversification and bank value: Shorter time period (2009-2013)
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q. Method: System Generalized Method of Moments.
Without control variables With control variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged Tobin’s Q 0.56*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.44*** 0.57*** 0.54*** 0.39*** 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.42*** 0.42***
(3.25) (3.18) (3.83) (3.15) (3.33) (3.98) (3.48) (3.36) (3.64) (3.76) (3.49) (3.74)
TOTAL 0.06 0.07
(1.41) (1.52)
INTRA 0.11* 0.09*
(2.37) (1.82)
INTER -0.27 0.03
(1.50) (0.26)
ID ∗ ECa 0.07 0.16** -0.21 0.08 0.12** -0.02**
(1.24) (2.05) (1.07) (1.31) (2.39) (0.21)
ID ∗ DCa 0.25 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06
(1.29) (0.31) (0.45) (0.40) (0.64) (0.62)
Number of observations 564 564 564 564 564 564 560 560 560 560 560 560
Number of banks 139 139 139 139 139 139 138 138 138 138 138 138
Number of instruments 32 46 32 46 32 46 92 106 92 106 92 106
AR(2) p-valueb 0.49 0.48 0.45 0.42 0.47 0.47 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.94 0.91
Hansen p-valuec 0.16 0.50 0.27 0.42 0.25 0.40 0.41 0.68 0.49 0.75 0.29 0.27
See notes for Table 1. For brevity, the estimated coefficients on ‘Emerging’, ‘Income diversity’, ‘Capitalization’, ‘Operational Inefficiency’, ‘NPL’, ‘Growth’ and ‘Inflation’
are not displayed.
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Table 5: Robustness tests: Alternative specifications
Dependent variable: Market-to-book (columns (1)-(3)), Tobin’s Q (columns (4)-(12)). Method: System Generalized Method of Moments.
Using alternative dependent Using ‘INTRA-Home’ Using five regions Excluding Chinese banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Lagged Market-to-Book 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.43***
(4.17) (4.18) (4.70)
Lagged Tobin’s Q 0.26** 0.31** 0.28* 0.26** 0.28** 0.26* 0.25** 0.29** 0.25
(2.38) (2.46) (1.78) (2.25) (2.34) (1.73) (2.15) (2.27) (1.62)
TOTAL ∗ EC 0.21 0.12 0.11 0.08
(1.07) (1.47) (1.50) (0.79)
TOTAL ∗ DC 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04
(0.05) (0.80) (0.25) (0.57)
INTRA ∗ EC 0.42*** 0.19** 0.19*** 0.16**
(2.87) (2.47) (3.17) (2.56)
INTRA ∗ DC -0.09 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.66) (0.45) (0.13) (0.27)
INTER ∗ EC -0.34 -0.10* -0.11** -0.16
(1.38) (1.72) (2.02) (1.54)
INTER ∗ DC -0.29 -0.08 -0.13 -0.19
(0.70) (0.84) (1.05) (1.04)
Number of observations 698 698 698 698 698 698 698 698 698 652 652 652
Number of banks 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 122 122 122
Number of instruments 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108
AR(2) p-valueb 0.78 0.88 0.90 0.94 0.79 0.90 0.94 0.81 0.91 0.97 0.83 0.98
Hansen p-valuec 0.54 0.48 0.35 0.49 0.52 0.18 0.60 0.73 0.15 0.46 0.72 0.29
See notes for Table 1. For brevity, estimated coefficients on ‘Emerging’, ‘Income diversity’, ‘Capitalization’, ‘Operational Inefficiency’, ‘NPL’, ‘Growth’ and ‘Inflation’
are not displayed.
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Table 6: Robustness tests: Controlling for geographic and institutional distance
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q. Method: System Generalized Method of Moments.
Geographic distance Institutional distance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged Tobin’s Q 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.27**
(3.94) (3.43) (3.03) (2.96) (3.17) (2.02)
TOTAL ∗ EC 0.04 -0.01
(0.86) (0.12)
TOTAL ∗ DC -0.01 -0.02
(0.16) (0.29)
INTRA ∗ EC 0.13*** 0.14**
(2.80) (2.15)
INTRA ∗ DC -0.02 -0.01
(0.51) (0.41)
INTER ∗ EC -0.19* -0.22***
(1.69) (3.01)
INTER ∗ DC -0.18 -0.23
(1.43) (1.25)
Geographic Distance 0.02 0.01 0.03
(1.38) (0.66) (1.52)
Institutional Distance 0.04*** 0.02 0.05***
(2.82) (1.56) (3.07)
Number of observations 698 698 698 693 693 693
Number of banks 139 139 139 137 137 137
Number of instruments 122 122 122 122 122 122
AR(2) p-valueb 0.87 0.77 0.78 0.93 0.86 0.89
Hansen p-valuec 0.35 0.18 0.34 0.56 0.56 0.53
See notes for Table 1. For brevity, estimated coefficients on ‘Emerging’, ‘Income diversity’, ‘Capital-
ization’, ‘Operational Inefficiency’, ‘NPL’, ‘Growth’ and ‘Inflation’ are not displayed.
Table 7: Robustness tests: Alternative diversification measures
Dependent variable: Tobin’s Q. Method: System Generalized Method of Moments.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged Tobin’s Q 2.25** 0.25** 0.28** 0.37*** 0.26** 0.20 0.26* 0.24*
(2.11) (2.25) (2.12) (2.96) (2.17) (1.19) (1.89) (1.92)
International Concentration 0.12
(1.63)
Regional Concentration 0.18**
(2.03)
Global Ratio 0.03
(0.69)
Intra-Regional Ratio 0.02
(1.43)
ID ∗ ECa 0.18 0.20* 0.06 0.04*
(1.44) (1.73) (0.69) (2.11)
ID ∗ DCa 0.06 -0.05 -0.16 0.02
(0.49) (1.20) (0.71) (0.28)
Number of observations 698 698 698 698 698 698 698 698
Number of banks 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139
Number of instruments 94 108 94 108 94 108 94 108
AR(2) p-valueb 0.98 0.94 0.81 0.75 0.99 0.94 0.98 0.95
Hansen p-valuec 0.41 0.61 0.28 0.35 0.28 0.25 0.30 0.36
See notes for Table 1.
a ID ∈ {‘International Concentration’, ‘Regional Concentration’, ‘Global Ratio’, ‘Intra-Regional Ratio’}. For
brevity, the estimated coefficients on ‘Emerging’, ‘Income diversity’, ‘Capitalization’, ‘Operational Inefficiency’,
‘NPL’, ‘Growth’ and ‘Inflation’ are not displayed.
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